At the table but can not break through the glass ceiling:Board leadership positions elude diverse directors

Laura Casares Field, Matthew E. Souther and Adam S. Yore

Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, vol. 137, issue 3, 787-814

Abstract: We explore the labor market effects of gender and race by examining board leadership appointments. Prior studies are often limited by observing only hired candidates, whereas the boardroom provides a controlled setting where both hired and unhired candidates are observable. Although diverse (female and minority) board representation has increased, diverse directors are significantly less likely to serve in leadership positions despite possessing stronger qualifications than nondiverse directors. While specialized skills such as prior leadership or finance experience increase the likelihood of appointment, that likelihood is reduced for diverse directors. Additional tests provide no evidence that diverse directors are less effective.

Keywords: Boards of directors; Diversity; Gender; Women; Minorities; Chairman of the board; Board committees; Director compensation; Pay gap; Leadership gap; Underrepresentation; Committee chair (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 J15 J16 J31 J71 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:137:y:2020:i:3:p:787-814

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.04.001

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