Active catering to dividend clienteles: Evidence from takeovers

Andrey Golubov, Meziane Lasfer and Valeriya Vitkova

Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, vol. 137, issue 3, 815-836

Abstract: We use merger-induced changes to shareholder structure to test for active catering to dividend clienteles. Following mergers, acquirers adjust their dividend payout toward that of the target, but only when they inherit target shareholders through stock swaps. This adjustment is stronger when legacy shareholders are more influential and reveal a greater preference for dividends through portfolio holdings and trading behavior. Country-level differences in dividend taxes, governance quality, and population age further shape the extent of adjustment in ways consistent with dividend preferences. Pre-closing, differences in dividend payout discourage the use of stock as a payment method.

Keywords: Dividend policy; Mergers and acquisitions; Clientele effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:137:y:2020:i:3:p:815-836

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.04.002

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