EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Information arrival, delay, and clustering in financial markets with dynamic freeriding

Cyrus Aghamolla and Tadashi Hashimoto

Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, vol. 138, issue 1, 27-52

Abstract: We study informational freeriding in a model where agents privately acquire information and then decide when to reveal it by taking an action. Examples of such freeriding are prevalent in financial markets, e.g., the timing of initial public offerings, analysts’ forecasts, and mutual funds’ investment decisions. The main results show that, in large populations, few agents provide significant information while the vast majority of agents freeride. We highlight the role of uncertainty and market size in shaping the dynamics of price discovery. Among other results, we find that heightened uncertainty over the underlying state enhances information production, yet weakens the precision and speed of information aggregation in the market.

Keywords: Informational freeriding; Information provision; Endogenous timing; Information acquisition; Herding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 G14 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X20301288
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:138:y:2020:i:1:p:27-52

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.04.011

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Economics is currently edited by G. William Schwert

More articles in Journal of Financial Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:138:y:2020:i:1:p:27-52