Testing the effectiveness of consumer financial disclosure: Experimental evidence from savings accounts
Paul Adams,
Stefan Hunt,
Christopher Palmer and
Redis Zaliauskas
Journal of Financial Economics, 2021, vol. 141, issue 1, 122-147
Abstract:
While popular with policymakers, most evidence on consumer financial disclosure’s effectiveness studies borrowing decisions (where optimality is unclear) or lab experiments (where attention is not scarce). We provide field evidence from randomized controlled trials with 124,000 savings account holders at five UK depositories. Treated consumers were disclosed varying degrees of salient information about alternative products, including one with their current provider strictly dominating their current product. Despite switching taking roughly 15 minutes and the moderate average potential gains ($190/year), switching is rare across disclosure designs and depositors. We find pessimistic beliefs drive disclosure inattention and limit disclosure’s effectiveness, helping explain deposit stickiness.
Keywords: Disclosure; Sticky deposits; Financial regulation; Inattention; Switching costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D14 D83 E21 G21 G28 M38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:141:y:2021:i:1:p:122-147
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.05.009
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