Dynastic control without ownership: Evidence from post-war Japan

Morten Bennedsen, Vikas Mehrotra, Jungwook Shim and Yupana Wiwattanakantang

Journal of Financial Economics, 2021, vol. 142, issue 2, 831-843

Abstract: Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding-family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than 5%). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki, and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes family ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of family legacy and talent.

Keywords: Family control; Ownership; Succession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:142:y:2021:i:2:p:831-843

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.018

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