How voluntary information sharing systems form: Evidence from a U.S. commercial credit bureau

José Liberti, Jason Sturgess and Andrew Sutherland

Journal of Financial Economics, 2022, vol. 145, issue 3, 827-849

Abstract: We use the introduction of a U.S. commercial credit bureau to study when lenders adopt voluntary information sharing technology and the resulting consequences for competition and credit access. Our results suggest that lenders trade off access to new markets against heightened competition for their own borrowers. Lenders that initially do not adopt lose borrowers to competitors that do, which ultimately compels them to adopt and leads to the formation of an information sharing system. Access to credit improves but only for high-quality borrowers in markets with greater lender adoption. We provide the first direct evidence on when financial intermediaries adopt information sharing technologies and how sharing systems form and evolve.

Keywords: Information sharing; Access to credit; Financial intermediation; Fintech; SMEs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G23 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: How Voluntary Information Sharing Systems Form: Evidence from a U.S. Commercial Credit Bureau (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:145:y:2022:i:3:p:827-849

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.023

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