The effect of female leadership on contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street

Jonathan Brogaard, Nataliya Gerasimova and Maximilian Rohrer

Journal of Financial Economics, 2024, vol. 155, issue C

Abstract: This paper provides novel evidence that female politicians increase the proportion of US government procurement contracts allocated to women-owned firms. For identification, we use a regression discontinuity design on a sample of mixed-gender elections in the US House of Representatives. The effect grows over a female representative's tenure and concentrates in female representatives who are on powerful congressional committees. Changes in the pool of and behavior by government contractors cannot explain the result. The more gender-balanced representation in government contracting is not associated with economic costs.

Keywords: Small business; Women-owned firms; Government procurement contracts; Female politicians; Gender gap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G38 H57 J16 J71 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:155:y:2024:i:c:s0304405x24000400

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103817

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