Token-based platform governance

Joseph Abadi and Markus Brunnermeier

Journal of Financial Economics, 2024, vol. 162, issue C

Abstract: We develop a model to compare the governance of traditional shareholder-owned platforms to that of platforms that issue tokens. A traditional shareholder governance structure leads a platform to extract rents from its users. A platform that issues tokens for its services can mitigate this rent extraction, as rent extraction lowers the platform owners’ token seigniorage revenues. However, this mitigation from issuing “service tokens” is effective only if the platform can commit itself not to dilute the “service token” subsequently. Issuing “hybrid tokens” that bundle claims on the platform’s services and its profits enhances efficiency even absent ex-ante commitment power. Finally, giving users the right to vote on platform policies, by contrast, redistributes surplus but does not necessarily enhance efficiency.

Keywords: Utility tokens; Platforms; DeFi; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:162:y:2024:i:c:s0304405x24001740

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103951

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