Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence

Amiyatosh Purnanandam

Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, vol. 87, issue 3, 706-739

Abstract: This paper extends the current theoretical models of corporate risk-management in the presence of financial distress costs and tests the model's predictions using a comprehensive data set. I show that the shareholders optimally engage in ex-post (i.e., after the debt issuance) risk-management activities even without a pre-commitment to do so. The model predicts a positive (negative) relation between leverage and hedging for moderately (highly) leveraged firms. Consistent with the theory, empirically I find a non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging. Further, the effect of leverage on hedging is higher for firms in highly concentrated industries.

Date: 2008
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