Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting

John R. Graham, Si Li and Jiaping Qiu

Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, vol. 89, issue 1, 44-61

Abstract: This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan Contracting (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:89:y:2008:i:1:p:44-61

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