Auctioned IPOs: The US evidence

Francois Degeorge (), Francois Derrien () and Kent Womack

Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, vol. 98, issue 2, 177-194

Abstract: Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht completed 19 initial public offerings (IPOs) in the US using an auction mechanism. We analyze investor behavior and mechanism performance in these auctioned IPOs using detailed bidding data. The existence of some bids posted at high prices suggests that some investors (mostly retail) try to free-ride on the mechanism. But institutional demand in these auctions is very elastic, suggesting that institutional investors reveal information in the bidding process. Investor participation is largely predictable based on deal size, and demand is dominated by institutions. Flipping is at most as prevalent in auctions as in bookbuilt deals. But, unlike in bookbuilding, investors in auctions do not flip their shares more in "hot" deals. Finally, we find that institutional investors, who provide more information, are rewarded by obtaining a larger share of the deals that have higher 10-day underpricing. Our results therefore suggest that auctioned IPOs can be an effective alternative to traditional bookbuilding.

Keywords: Initial; public; offerings; Investment; banking; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Auctioned IPOs: The U.S. Evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Auctioned IPOs: the U.S. Evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Auctioned IPOs: the U.S. Evidence (2009)
Working Paper: Auctioned IPOs: The U.S. Evidence (2009)
Working Paper: Auctioned IPOs: The U.S. Evidence (2009)
Working Paper: Auctioned IPOs: The U.S. Evidence (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:98:y:2010:i:2:p:177-194

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