Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks
Gabriella Chiesa ()
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2008, vol. 17, issue 4, 464-477
We examine the implications of optimal credit risk transfer (CRT) for bank-loan monitoring, and the incentives for banks to engage in optimal CRT. In our model, properly designed CRT instruments allow banks to insure themselves against loan losses precisely in those states that signal monitoring. We find that optimal CRT enhances loan monitoring and expands financial intermediation, in contrast to the findings of the previous literature. Optimal CRT instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual loans and have credit-enhancement guarantees, pretty much as banks do in practice. But the extent of credit enhancement needs to be precisely delimited. Above that exact level, monitoring incentives are undermined (loan quality deteriorates) and wealth is transferred from the bank's financiers to the bank. Properly designed risk-based capital requirements are shown to prevent such a wealth transfer and to provide banks with the incentive to engage in optimal CRT.
Keywords: Credit; risk; transfer; Monitoring; incentives; Prudential; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Optimal Credit Risk Transfer, Monitored Finance, and Banks (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:17:y:2008:i:4:p:464-477
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