Internal and external discipline following securities class actions

Mark Humphery-Jenner

Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2012, vol. 21, issue 1, 151-179

Abstract: Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.

Keywords: Securities class actions; Securities law; Governance; Ethics; Takeovers; Managerial turnover; Fraud; Disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:21:y:2012:i:1:p:151-179

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.001

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