Transparency as a remedy for agency problems in securitization? The case of ECB’s loan-level reporting initiative

Philipp Klein, Carina Mössinger and Andreas Pfingsten

Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2021, vol. 46, issue C

Abstract: Poor transparency of asset-backed securities (ABS) exacerbated the latest subprime lending crisis. In response, the European Central Bank introduced the ABS loan-level reporting initiative, obliging originators to disclose quarterly loan-by-loan information. However, does this increase in transparency alleviate the agency problems inherent in securitization? To answer this question, we examine a novel dataset of 107 ABS pools that are backed by more than 2.8 million loans for small and medium-sized enterprises from the first securitization repository in Europe. The results show that the increase in transparency indeed has valuable effects for investors, inducing originators to improve pool performance and diversification for existing as well as newly issued ABS. These effects persist for a large set of control variables and a broad variety of robustness tests.

Keywords: Agency problems; Diversification; ECB; Performance; Securitization; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G21 G23 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957320300073
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:46:y:2021:i:c:s1042957320300073

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100853

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Intermediation is currently edited by Elu von Thadden

More articles in Journal of Financial Intermediation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().