Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management
Juan Sotes-Paladino and
Fernando Zapatero
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2022, vol. 52, issue C
Abstract:
Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.
Keywords: Portfolio delegation; Benchmarking; Fulcrum fees; Asymmetric information; Passive management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G11 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957322000341
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:52:y:2022:i:c:s1042957322000341
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100981
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Financial Intermediation is currently edited by Elu von Thadden
More articles in Journal of Financial Intermediation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().