To wait or to pay for medical treatment? Restraining ex-post moral hazard in health insurance

Stefan Felder

Journal of Health Economics, 2008, vol. 27, issue 6, 1418-1422

Abstract: We explore the hierarchy of two instruments, waiting time and coinsurance for medical treatment, for optimally solving the tradeoff between the economic gains from risk sharing and the losses from moral hazard. We show that the optimal waiting time is zero, given that the coinsurance rate is optimally set.

Keywords: Waiting; time; Coinsurance; Moral; hazard; Optimal; insurance; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:27:y:2008:i:6:p:1418-1422

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