 Rationing the public provision of healthcare in the presence of private supplements: Evidence from the Italian NHSDaniele Fabbri and Chiara Monfardini Journal of Health Economics, 2009, vol. 28, issue 2, 290-304 Abstract: In this paper we assess the relative effectiveness of user charges and administrative waiting times as a tool for rationing public healthcare in Italy. We measure demand elasticities by estimating a simultaneous equation model of GP primary care visits, public specialist consultations and private specialist consultations, as if they were part of an incomplete system of demand. We find that for public specialist consultations, own price elasticity of demand is about -0.3, while elasticity to administrative waiting time is about -.04. No substitution exists between the demand for public and private specialists, so that user charges act as a net deterrent for over-consumption. The public provision of healthcare does not induce the wealthy to opt out. Moreover our evidence suggests that user charges and waiting lists do not serve redistributive purposes. Keywords: Healthcare; demand; elasticities; User; charges; Waiting; lists; Multivariate; count; data; model (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:28:y:2009:i:2:p:290-304 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Health Economics is currently edited by J. P. Newhouse, A. J. Culyer, R. Frank, K. Claxton and T. McGuire More articles in Journal of Health Economics from Elsevier |
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