Economic considerations for social distancing and behavioral based policies during an epidemic

Eli P. Fenichel

Journal of Health Economics, 2013, vol. 32, issue 2, 440-451

Abstract: Public policies intended to induce behavioral change, specifically incentives to reduce interpersonal contacts or to “social distance,” increasingly play a prominent role in public disease response strategies as governments plan for and respond to major epidemics. I compare social distancing incentives and outcomes under decentralized, full control social planner, and constrained social planner, without health class specific control, decision making scenarios. Constrained social planner decision making, based on non-health class specific controls, can in some instances make society worse off than decentralized decision making (i.e. no intervention). The oft neglected behavior of recovered and immune individuals is important for welfare and health outcomes.

Keywords: Public health; Infectious disease; Dynamic optimization; SIR model; Adaptive behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 I1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (72)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:2:p:440-451

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.01.002

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