Increasing organ donation via changes in the default choice or allocation rule

Danyang Li, Zackary Hawley and Kurt Schnier ()

Journal of Health Economics, 2013, vol. 32, issue 6, 1117-1129

Abstract: This research utilizes a laboratory experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative public policies targeted at increasing the rate of deceased donor organ donation. The experiment includes treatments across different default choices and organ allocation rules inspired by the donor registration systems applied in different countries. Our results indicate that the opt-out with priority rule system generates the largest increase in organ donation relative to an opt-in only program. However, sizeable gains are achievable using either a priority rule or opt-out program separately, with the opt-out rule generating approximately 80% of the benefits achieved under a priority rule program.

Keywords: Health; Organ donation; Laboratory experiment; Government policy; Public health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 I10 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Working Paper: Increasing Organ Donation via Changes in the Default Choice or Allocation Rule (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:6:p:1117-1129

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.09.007

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