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The changing of the guards

Simen Markussen, Knut Røed () and Ole Rogeberg

Journal of Health Economics, 2013, vol. 32, issue 6, 1230-1239

Abstract: Using administrative data from Norway, we examine the extent to which family doctors influence their clients’ propensity to claim sick-pay. The analysis exploits exogenous switches of family doctors occurring when physicians quit, retire, or for other reasons sell their patient lists. We find that family doctors have significant influence on their clients’ absence behavior, particularly on absence duration. Their influence is stronger in geographical areas with weaker competition between physicians. We conclude that it is possible for family doctors to contain sick-pay expenditures to some extent, and that there is a considerable variation in the way they perform this task.

Keywords: Sick-pay; GP practice styles; Absence certification; Gatekeepers; Family doctors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:6:p:1230-1239

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.10.005

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Journal of Health Economics is currently edited by J. P. Newhouse, A. J. Culyer, R. Frank, K. Claxton and T. McGuire

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