Did you get your shots? Experimental evidence on the role of reminders
Matias Busso,
Julian Cristia () and
Sarah Humpage
Journal of Health Economics, 2015, vol. 44, issue C, 226-237
Abstract:
Many families fail to vaccinate their children despite the supply of these services at no cost. This study tests whether personal reminders can increase demand for vaccination. A field experiment was conducted in rural Guatemala in which timely reminders were provided to families whose children were due for a vaccine. The six-month intervention increased the probability of vaccination completion by 2.2 percentage points among all children in treatment communities. Moreover, for children in treatment communities who were due to receive a vaccine, and whose parents were expected to be reminded about that due date, the probability of vaccination completion increased by 4.6 percentage points. The cost of an additional child with complete vaccination due to the intervention is estimated at about $7.50.
Keywords: Vaccination; Reminders; Field experiment; Guatemala (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 I14 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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Working Paper: Did You Get Your Shots? Experimental Evidence on the Role of Reminders (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:44:y:2015:i:c:p:226-237
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.08.005
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