Competitive long-term health insurance
Thomas Wiseman ()
Journal of Health Economics, 2018, vol. 58, issue C, 144-150
I study the interplay among competition, contractual commitment, income risk, and saving and borrowing in insuring consumers against both short-term healthcare expenses and longer-term changes in health status. Examining different combinations of firms’ ability to commit to long-term contracts, consumers’ access to credit markets, and the availability of termination fees helps to highlight sources of inefficiency.
Keywords: Insurance; Reclassification risk; One-sided commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:58:y:2018:i:c:p:144-150
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