Quality disclosure and the timing of insurers’ adjustments: Evidence from medicare advantage
Journal of Health Economics, 2018, vol. 61, issue C, 13-26
Mandatory quality disclosure often includes a period over which the quality of new entrants is unreported. This provides the opportunity for forward-looking firms to adjust product characteristics in advance of disclosure. Using comprehensive data on Medicare Advantage (MA) from 2007 to 2015, I exploit the design of the MA Star Rating program to examine the presence of forward-looking behavior among insurers. I find that high-quality insurers reduce prices leading up to quality disclosure, while low-quality insurers increase prices in advance of quality disclosure. These dynamics are consistent with firms anticipating a future change in consumer inertia and updating current-period prices accordingly.
Keywords: Quality disclosure; Health insurance; Medicare Advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:61:y:2018:i:c:p:13-26
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Health Economics is currently edited by J. P. Newhouse, A. J. Culyer, R. Frank, K. Claxton and T. McGuire
More articles in Journal of Health Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().