How disability insurance reforms change the consequences of health shocks on income and employment
Patrick Hullegie and
Pierre Koning ()
Journal of Health Economics, 2018, vol. 62, issue C, 134-146
This paper examines whether Dutch disability insurance reforms have helped or hindered employment opportunities of workers that are facing unanticipated shocks to their health. An important component of the reforms was to make employers responsible for paying sickness benefits and to strengthen their sickness monitoring obligations. This may stimulate preventive and reintegration activities by firms. Using administrative data on hospitalizations, we conclude that both financial incentives and monitoring obligations have substantially lowered DI receipt and increased the employment of workers after a health shock.
JEL-codes: H53 J14 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:62:y:2018:i:c:p:134-146
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