 Pricing regulations in individual health insurance: Evidence from MedigapVilsa E. Curto Journal of Health Economics, 2023, vol. 91, issue C Abstract: I compare two pricing regulations that protect those with health conditions—“community rating,” which requires insurers to charge uniform premiums, and “guaranteed renewal,” which requires insurers to increase future premiums uniformly. Using individual-level Medigap data from 2006–2010, I compare individuals within 25 miles of borders between 3 community rating and 6 guaranteed renewal states. Relative to guaranteed renewal, community rating (with guaranteed issue) leads to a decrease in Medigap enrollment of 9.70 pp (29.7%), or 26.8–33.7% for low-spending conditions (diabetes, heart disease) and 21.9–29.9% for high-spending conditions (cancer, kidney disease); an increase in annual Medigap premiums of $276 (10.1%); a decrease in the likelihood of an earlier purchase of 7.99 pp (50.3%); and an increase in purchase delay of 1.08 years (17.0%). Keywords: Health insurance; Adverse selection; Community rating; Guaranteed renewal; Medigap; Medicare supplemental insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:91:y:2023:i:c:s0167629623000620 DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2023.102785 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Health Economics is currently edited by J. P. Newhouse, A. J. Culyer, R. Frank, K. Claxton and T. McGuire More articles in Journal of Health Economics from Elsevier |
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