Put a bet on it: Can self-funded commitment contracts curb fitness procrastination?

Devon Spika, Linnea Wickström Östervall, Ulf Gerdtham and Erik Wengström

Journal of Health Economics, 2024, vol. 98, issue C

Abstract: We investigate the use of a highly scalable intervention to help individuals achieve their physical activity goals: self-funded commitment contracts. Using a randomised experiment, we compare the effect of soft (non-incentivised) and hard (incentivised) contracts among 1629 members of a gym in Stockholm, Sweden. We find a significant positive impact of being offered a hard contract on monthly visits to the gym and the probability of meeting one’s contract goal. Relative to the control group, being offered a hard contract significantly increases gym visits by 21%, while being offered a soft contract leads to an 8% increase.

Keywords: Gym attendance; Incentives; Commitment contract; Self-control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D01 I12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:98:y:2024:i:c:s0167629624000882

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102943

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