Rental externality, tenure security, and housing quality

Shinichiro Iwata and Hisaki Yamaga

Journal of Housing Economics, 2008, vol. 17, issue 3, 201-211

Abstract: This paper considers two tenure modes--owner- and renter-occupied housing--and models the effect of the rental externality and tenure security on single-family housing quality. We show that both rental externality and tenure security reduce renter-occupied housing quality when the user's utilization, which reduces the quality of the accommodation, and the owner's maintenance, which raises quality, are substitutes. Using single-family housing data in Japan, we obtain empirical results that are consistent with theoretical predictions. These results indicate that conventional wisdom--that the quality of renter-occupied housing is lower than that of owner-occupied housing--is supported for single-family housing in Japan.

Keywords: Rental; externality; Tenure; security; Housing; quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:17:y:2008:i:3:p:201-211

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