Jump bids in real estate auctions

Dag Einar Sommervoll

Journal of Housing Economics, 2020, vol. 49, issue C

Abstract: The lion’s share of Norwegian homes changes hands through closely monitored and regulated auctions. Some housing market experts advocate the supremacy of a jump bid, a significant bid increase to discourage fellow bidders, and thereby acquire the dwelling at a lower price compared to bidding strategy with moderate bid increases. We find no evidence for the efficacy of this jump bid strategy. Jump bidders, if successful, pay a positive jump premium. This also applies to the case where the jump is not the final bid and the jump bidder win at a later stage. In this case, the jump bid premium is around 1 to 2%. However, a jump bid is a credible signal of “serious intentions”. Jump bidders tend to win auction more often even in cases, where the jump bid is matched, and the auction continues.

Keywords: Real estate auctions; Jump bids (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D44 R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:49:y:2020:i:c:s1051137720300498

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2020.101713

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