Economics at your fingertips  

Effects of regulating the brokerage commission in the rental market: Evidence from Buenos Aires

Ricardo A. Pasquini

Journal of Housing Economics, 2021, vol. 54, issue C

Abstract: In the rental market, one of the measures that governments take to benefit tenants is to exempt them from their obligation to pay the real estate commission, transferring this obligation to landlords. A recent experience in the City of Buenos Aires from the sanction of a law of this type has characteristics of a quasi-experiment, allowing the study of the causal effects of this policy on rental prices and related contractual conditions. In order to identify this effect, I propose exploiting the differences in the geographic discontinuity along the city limit. I find an increase in average rents of a magnitude consistent with the theoretical result that owners transfer the value of the commission to tenants but distributed throughout the contract. In other words, it is consistent with a financing effect, where the commission is financed throughout the contract. I also find suggestive evidence indicating owners changed their security deposit requirements, probably to finance the commission.

Keywords: Rental market; Brokerage commission; Difference in geographic discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C01 C23 D04 R3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2021.101793

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Housing Economics is currently edited by H. O. Pollakowski

More articles in Journal of Housing Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2022-03-12
Handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:54:y:2021:i:c:s1051137721000437