Analyst forecast properties, analyst following and governance disclosures: A global perspective
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2010, vol. 19, issue 1, 1-15
This paper examines the relations between analyst forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, analyst following and the quantity of governance disclosures in a global setting. I document that companies with more comprehensive corporate governance disclosures in annual reports have more accurate and less dispersed earnings forecasts from financial analysts. These findings indicate that analysts understand the implications of corporate governance for future cash flows. In addition to the improved quality of information released by financial analysts, I also find that disclosing more information on corporate governance attracts more financial analysts, thereby enhancing a firm's information environment. These findings underscore the benefits of disclosing information related to corporate governance practices for global firms.
Keywords: Analyst forecast accuracy; Analyst forecast dispersion; Analyst following; Corporate governance disclosures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jiaata:v:19:y:2010:i:1:p:1-15
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation is currently edited by R. Larson
More articles in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().