 Executive compensation disclosure, ownership concentration and dual-class firms: An analysis of Swedish dataKatarzyna Cieslak, Mattias Hamberg and Derya Vural Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2021, vol. 45, issue C Abstract: We study how executive compensation disclosure (ECD) is affected by the economic incentives of owners and managers in a Swedish setting where agency conflicts are not so much between managers and owners, but between controlling and non-controlling owners. In our sample, control is often enhanced through mechanisms such as dual share classes. The analysis relies on detailed hand-collected ECD data from 2837 annual reports. As expected, disclosure decreases with ownership concentration and the owner’s excess voting rights. In Sweden, overpaid Chief Executive Offices (CEOs) improve ECD quality, but this is not the case when the controlling owner has excess control rights. This suggests that when managers have a bond with controlling owners, ECD is part of the agency problem between controlling and non-controlling owners, and executive compensation plays a different role than in previously studied Anglo-Saxon settings. Keywords: Executive compensation; Disclosure; Sweden; Dual class shares; Agency problems (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jiaata:v:45:y:2021:i:c:s1061951821000549 DOI: 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2021.100429 Access Statistics for this article Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation is currently edited by R. Larson More articles in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.