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CEO duality and tax avoidance: Empirical evidence from Greece

Georgios Kolias and Evangelos Koumanakos

Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2022, vol. 47, issue C

Abstract: Using a unique dataset, with matched tax returns and corporate governance features at the firm level, we estimate the impact of consolidating or splitting the chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board (COB) positions on corporate tax avoidance. Contrary to the empirical findings provided by concurrent finance research, policy-makers’ beliefs, and anecdotal evidence from around the world, we argue that CEO duality has a negative effect on corporate tax avoidance, at least as far as the Greek business environment is concerned. Our findings are consistent with what mainstream agency theory and psychology suggest about the role and impact of groups in risk-taking activities and decision-making processes in general.

Keywords: CEO Duality; Book-Tax Differences; Average Treatment Effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 D91 H26 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jiaata:v:47:y:2022:i:c:s1061951822000209

DOI: 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2022.100465

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