 Media attention and agency costs: Evidence from listed companies in ChinaYunbi An, Han Jin, Qingfu Liu and Kaixin Zheng Journal of International Money and Finance, 2022, vol. 124, issue C Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of media attention on agency costs based on data on Chinese listed companies. We find that in China, media with a higher degree of independence tend to cover more negative corporate news. In addition, negative media coverage better captures the intensity of media attention, and significantly reduces agency costs in Chinese firms. We further demonstrate that negative media coverage plays an important role in improving the quality of information disclosure and inducing the intervention of regulatory authorities, thereby mitigating agency conflicts in listed companies. However, negative media coverage cannot effectively push corporate managers to correct their behaviors by affecting their reputation. Finally, compared with non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), SOEs receiving negative news reports are less likely to improve the quality of their information disclosure, more likely to be punished by regulatory authorities, and less likely to be influenced by managerial reputation concerns. Keywords: Media attention; Agency costs; Information disclosure; Regulatory penalty; Managerial reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:124:y:2022:i:c:s0261560622000122 DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2022.102609 Access Statistics for this article Journal of International Money and Finance is currently edited by J. R. Lothian More articles in Journal of International Money and Finance from Elsevier |
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