Economic stabilization in the post-crisis world: Are fiscal rules the answer?
U. Michael Bergman and
Michael Hutchison
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2015, vol. 52, issue C, 82-101
Abstract:
We investigate whether fiscal rules help to reduce the extent of policy procyclicality—how government expenditure policy responds to GDP-- in a dynamic panel framework with 81 advanced, emerging and developing countries over 1985–2012. We construct two new fiscal rule indices and investigate whether rules help to dampen procyclical policies. We condition our empirical specifications on the degree to which governments appear able to manage and enforce fiscal rules. We find that fiscal rules are very effective in reducing procyclicality of policy once a minimum threshold of government efficiency/quality has been reached. Government efficiency alone is not enough to reduce procyclicality of fiscal policy. However, high government efficiency combined with strong fiscal rules is a potent combination facilitating counter-cyclical policy responses to GDP movements.
Keywords: Fiscal rules; Government efficiency; Policy procyclicality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E62 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:52:y:2015:i:c:p:82-101
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2014.11.014
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