Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers

Donato Masciandaro () and Alessio Volpicella ()

Journal of International Money and Finance, 2016, vol. 61, issue C, 101-119

Abstract: The Great Crisis has highlighted the importance of establishing macro prudential architectures to address problems of financial stability. Central banks are always part of macro prudential settings, but their role is far from being homogeneous across countries, reflecting the fact that according to economic theory there are pros and cons in extending central bank influence to macro prudential supervision. The issue is then genuinely empirical: are there any meaningful drivers explaining the actual choices made by policymakers about the central bank's role in macro prudential governance?

Keywords: Macro prudential supervision; Micro prudential supervision; Central bank independence; Monetary policy rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E63 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:61:y:2016:i:c:p:101-119

DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.11.002

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