Sovereign debt and reserves with liquidity and productivity crises

Flavia Corneli and Emanuele Tarantino

Journal of International Money and Finance, 2016, vol. 65, issue C, 166-194

Abstract: During the recent financial crisis, emerging economies have kept accumulating both sovereign reserves and debt. To account for this empirical fact, we model the optimal portfolio choice of a sovereign that is subject to liquidity and productivity shocks. We determine the equilibrium level of debt and its cost by solving a contracting game between sovereign and international lenders. Although raising debt increases the sovereign exposure to liquidity and productivity crises, the simultaneous accumulation of reserves can mitigate the negative effects of such crises. This mechanism rationalizes the complementarity between debt and reserves.

Keywords: Sovereign debt; International reserves; Liquidity shock; Productivity shock; Strategic default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 F40 G15 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Sovereign debt and reserves with liquidity and productivity crises (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:65:y:2016:i:c:p:166-194

DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.02.016

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