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Creditor rights and the corporate bond market

Xian Gu and Oskar Kowalewski ()

Journal of International Money and Finance, 2016, vol. 67, issue C, 215-238

Abstract: This study examines whether investor protection affects capital markets, specifically the development of corporate bond markets versus equity markets. Using a dataset of 42 countries, we show that countries with strong creditor rights have more developed corporate bond markets than equity markets. However, we find only weak evidence that countries with stronger shareholder protection have more developed equity markets than corporate bond markets. Additionally, we find that the effect of financial reforms on capital markets is strongly dependent on the strength of investor protection and on the associated information disclosure in a given country.

Keywords: Corporate bond market; Equity market; Investor protection; Financial reform; Information disclosure; Crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G20 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Creditor rights and corporate bond market (2015) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:67:y:2016:i:c:p:215-238

DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.05.002

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