Did the reform fix the London fix problem?
Takatoshi Ito () and
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2018, vol. 80, issue C, 75-95
This paper examines the consequences of the 2015 reform on the London fixing in the interbank forex market, which resulted from finding and imposing a penalty on banks’ collusive behavior around the fixing window. The banks changed their behavior after the reform, and the volume spike in the fixing window disappeared. However, the anomalies on price dynamics reported in the previous literature still exist, and banks’ passive trading strategy generates another predictability in the price movement. A theoretical model of optimal execution is used to calibrate the execution of fixing transactions by banks, and evaluate the increase in the cost and risks of fixing trades incurred by the banks' behavior. This paper is the first to examine the efficiency of banks’ behavior after the reform. The volume pattern during the fixing time window suggests that banks, by avoiding (even the appearance of) collusion, now incur the costs of executing customers’ orders.
Keywords: Foreign exchange markets; Fixing; WM/Reuters; Manipulation; Pre-hedge; Collusion; Efficient market; Spikes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D47 F30 F31 F33 G12 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Did the Reform Fix the London Fix Problem? (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:80:y:2018:i:c:p:75-95
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of International Money and Finance is currently edited by J. R. Lothian
More articles in Journal of International Money and Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().