Testing the incentive effects in tournaments with a superstar
Ryuichi Tanaka and
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 2012, vol. 26, issue 3, 393-404
This paper studies the effects of the levels and the structure of prizes on the efforts of agents with heterogeneous ability in a tournament model. In particular, we examine how the presence of a highly able agent affects the effort levels of other agents as well as the effects of the total and the marginal prizes. Using panel data from the Japan Golf Tour, we estimate the effects of the presence of a superstar, and the size of the total and marginal prizes on the scores of professional golfers. We find that the presence of a superstar adversely affects the scores of the other players; that the larger the size of the total prize, the better are the scores; and that the larger the marginal prizes that players face at the end of the third round, the better the scores they achieve in the final round.
Keywords: Tournament model; Incentives; Prize allocation; Golf (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J44 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:26:y:2012:i:3:p:393-404
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