Microcredit games with noisy signals: Contagion and free-riding

Hisaki Kono

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 2014, vol. 33, issue C, 96-113

Abstract: The advent of microcredit financing has remarkably improved access to credit for the poor in many developing countries. Although several microcredit programs have adopted the joint liability scheme, economic theory suggests that joint liability could increase strategic default through contagion and free-riding. This paper aims at studying the extent of free-riding and contagion in joint liability lending. By using data from experimental repayment games conducted in Vietnam, with noisy signals that resemble actual microcredit programs, we found that subjects were motivated to free-ride under the joint liability scheme. While most empirical research in this area has focused on the problem of contagion, our findings point to the significance of investigating free-riding behavior under joint liability schemes. Analyses reveal that the free-riding tendency may be led by the irresponsiveness of repayment and shouldering behavior to the partner’s seemingly strategic default in the previous round.

Keywords: Microcredit; Joint liability; Free riding; Contagion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:96-113

DOI: 10.1016/j.jjie.2013.12.006

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