Empirical studies on strategic interaction among municipality governments over disaster waste after the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake
Takeshi Miyazaki and
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 2017, vol. 44, issue C, 26-38
Strategic interaction among governments has become a major focus of empirical and theoretical work in public economics. NIMBY is one application of the literature. In the present paper, we apply the NIMBY model to the disposal of disaster debris after the Great East Japan Earthquake when there was substantial concern over radioactive contamination following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant incident. We empirically test the strategic interaction among municipality governments. We find strong evidence of such interaction. That is, in deciding whether to accept disaster waste, the municipality governments appear to keep a close eye on other municipality governments’ choices.
Keywords: NIMBY; Strategic interaction; Great East Japan earthquake; Disaster waste disposal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:44:y:2017:i:c:p:26-38
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies is currently edited by Takeo Hoshi
More articles in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().