Presidential preferences for inflation versus unemployment

Peter A. Zaleski

Journal of Macroeconomics, 1992, vol. 14, issue 3, 555-561

Abstract: The notion that unemployment and inflation are determined by policy set to optimize a given objective function is fairly well established. This paper attempts to estimate the parameters of a quadratic loss function from the revealed preferences of policy makers. The results suggest that policy makers' preferences do not conform to the party cleavage model. Rather, policy makers, regardless of party, are more likely to adopt a balanced view toward inflation and unemployment.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:14:y:1992:i:3:p:555-561

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