Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime

Carsten Hefeker

Journal of Macroeconomics, 2010, vol. 32, issue 1, 338-346

Abstract: The paper analyzes the relation between institutional quality, such as corruption, in a country and its monetary regime. It is shown that a credibly fixed exchange rate to a low inflation country, like a currency board, can reduce corruption and improve the fiscal system. A monetary union, however, has ambiguous effects. I find that there is convergence between countries with regard to the level of corruption.

Keywords: Exchange; rate; regime; Monetary; policy; Fiscal; policy; Seigniorage; Corruption; Developing; and; transition; countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime (2009)
Working Paper: Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime (2009)
Working Paper: Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime (2008)
Working Paper: Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:32:y:2010:i:1:p:338-346

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