Financial development and occupational choice
Enoch Hill () and
David Perez-Reyna ()
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2017, vol. 54, issue PB, 393-409
In this paper we incorporate occupational choice in the style of Lucas (1978) with an additional dimension of heterogeneity in wealth into a model of banking. We use this model to better understand how development of the financial sector affects misallocation and occupational choice. Our model demonstrates three channels through which enforcement of credit contracts are tied to misallocation. Improvements in enforcement shifts the risks in variance of output from banks toward entrepreneurs; consequently, improved enforcement can serve as a form of risk sharing in the absence of state contingent loans. Second, reduction in the risk for bankers improves the appeal of banking and the general equilibrium effect shrinks the margin of intermediation, reducing the importance of initial wealth distributions. Finally, improved enforcement leads to more relaxed credit constraints, as banks are willing to lend more to entrepreneurs, further reducing the importance of initial wealth in occupational choice.
Keywords: Financial development; Misallocation; Occupational choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 G21 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:54:y:2017:i:pb:p:393-409
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