Dynamic analysis of bureaucratic quality and occupational choice

Kiyoka Akimoto

Journal of Macroeconomics, 2018, vol. 55, issue C, 199-214

Abstract: This paper analyzes the interdependency between bureaucratic quality and economic development. Capital accumulation changes bureaucratic quality through occupational choice in two cases. In the first case, the bureaucratic quality improves through economic development, and, in the second case, bureaucratic quality worsens or remains low. In both cases, good quality of bureaucracy cannot be realized without economic development. Workers and bureaucrats earn a higher income under a low-quality bureaucracy. A change in quality from low to high expands income inequality between unskilled and skilled individuals and contracts inequality among skilled individuals.

Keywords: Bureaucratic quality; Rent-seeking; Occupational choice; Dynamic analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J24 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:199-214

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2017.10.004

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