Debt stabilization games in a monetary union: What are the effects of introducing eurobonds?
Jacob Engwerda (),
Bas van Aarle and
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2019, vol. 59, issue C, 78-102
This paper analyzes how the introduction of Eurobonds affects debt dynamics in a two-country monetary union model. Monetary and fiscal authorities are engaged in dynamic government debt stabilization games in which interest rates on government debt adjust endogenously. Three different equilibria are considered: the non-cooperative Nash open-loop equilibrium, the fiscal coordination equilibrium and the fully cooperative equilibrium. It is shown how the effects of Eurobonds depend on the game-theoretic equilibrium/institutional framework in place, the initial debt levels, policy makers’ concerns with debt stabilization and the strength of financial market discipline.
Keywords: Debt stabilization; Monetary union; Non-linear dynamical systems; Risk premium; Eurobonds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C62 E6 F4 H6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:78-102
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