Generational conflict and education politics: Implications for growth and welfare

Yuki Uchida and Tetsuo Ono

Journal of Macroeconomics, 2021, vol. 69, issue C

Abstract: This study considers the politics of public education and its impact on economic growth and welfare across generations. We employ probabilistic voting to demonstrate the generational conflict regarding taxes and spending and show that aging shifts the tax burden from the retired to the working generation, reduces public education spending, and ultimately slows economic growth. We subsequently consider a legal constraint that aims to boost education spending: a spending floor for education. This constraint stimulates economic growth but creates a trade-off between current and future generations’ welfare. Finally, the quantitative implications of our results are explored by calibrating the model to the Japanese economy.

Keywords: Public education; Economic growth; Capital income tax; Probabilistic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 E24 H52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Generational Conflict and Education Politics: Implications for Growth and Welfare (2019)
Working Paper: Generational Conflict and Education Politics: Implications for Growth and Welfare (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:69:y:2021:i:c:s0164070421000240

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2021.103315

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