Monetary and fiscal coordination in preventing bank failures and financial contagion

Khai Zhi Sim

Journal of Macroeconomics, 2023, vol. 75, issue C

Abstract: This paper uses a theoretical model to analyze the optimal combination of monetary response (lowering of interest rates) and fiscal bailouts in preventing bank failures and financial contagion. I show that the optimal way of rescuing failing banks is to combine the two. This is because lower interest rates reduce the size of the bailout required to rescue failing banks as they reduce the cost for banks to raise and retain deposits. The main result of the paper is that banks are willing to monitor their investments more closely when they anticipate a monetary response in addition to bailouts in case of a banking crisis. Additionally, capital requirements such as the Basel Accords do not always incentivize banks to monitor their investments if there is a potential contagion from unhealthy to healthy banks.

Keywords: Bailout; Contagion; Financial regulation; Monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E61 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:75:y:2023:i:c:s016407042200091x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2022.103498

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