The partisanship of a central banker

Fabrizio Carmignani

Journal of Macroeconomics, 2025, vol. 83, issue C

Abstract: Even if formally established as independent, central banks may still be subject to partisan influences. The paper uses a simple new-Keynesian framework to model these influences as quiescence (i.e. when the central bank aligns with the ideological preferences of the incumbent government) or demurral (i.e. when the central bank moves away from the ideological preferences of the incumbent). The partisanship of the central bank then depends on which of these two prevails. The empirical analysis shows that different patterns of quiescence and demurral occur in different countries at different times. There is however also evidence that in some circumstances the conduct of monetary policy is non-partisan; that is, neither quiescence nor demurral prevails.

Keywords: Central bank; Partisan orientation; New-Keynesian model; Monetary policy rule; Conservativism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0164070424000715
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:83:y:2025:i:c:s0164070424000715

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2024.103657

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Macroeconomics is currently edited by Douglas McMillin and Theodore Palivos

More articles in Journal of Macroeconomics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().