Asserting independence: Optimal monetary policy when the central bank and political authority disagree

Justin Svec and Daniel L. Tortorice

Journal of Macroeconomics, 2025, vol. 85, issue C

Abstract: This paper solves for optimal monetary policy when households face uncertainty about whether the central bank is independent from the political authority. In our model an independent central bank maximizes its own preferences while a dependent central bank maximizes the preferences of the political authority. Households form beliefs regarding the likelihood that the central bank is independent and update these beliefs using Bayes” rule given the observed choice of interest rate. The central bank takes into account how its policy choice influences household beliefs. We find that the central bank suffers losses when it is perceived to be captured, leading the central bank to deviate from traditional optimal policy under rational expectations to demonstrate its independence to the households.

Keywords: Monetary policy; Central bank independence; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016407042500031X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:85:y:2025:i:c:s016407042500031x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103694

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Macroeconomics is currently edited by Douglas McMillin and Theodore Palivos

More articles in Journal of Macroeconomics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().